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A number of epidemics, including the SARS-CoV-1 epidemic of 2002-2004, have been known
to exhibit superspreading, in which a small fraction of infected individuals are responsible for the
majority of new infections. The existence of superspreading implies a fat-tailed distribution of
infectiousness (new secondary infections caused per day) among different individuals. Here, we
present a simple method to estimate the variation in infectiousness by examining the variation
in early-time growth rates of new cases among different subpopulations. We use this method to
estimate the mean and variance in the infectiousness, k, for SARS-CoV-2 transmission during the
early stages of the pandemic within the United States. We find that σk/µk & 3.7, where µk is the
mean infectiousness and σk is its standard deviation, which implies pervasive superspreading. This
result allows us to estimate that in the early stages of the pandemic in the USA, nearly 88% of new
cases were a result of the top 10% of most infectious individuals.
I. INTRODUCTION
The temporal growth of an epidemic is often charac-
terized by either a time scale (such as the doubling time)
[1, 2] or by the reproduction rate R0, which indicates
the average number of new infections produced by each
infected individual [3]. Estimates of R0 for the current
pandemic of SARS-CoV-2 range from 1.4 to 3.8 [4–7].
Neither of these numbers, however, gives any information
about the distribution of infectiousness among individu-
als — i.e., whether new infections arise relatively uni-
formly from all infected individuals, or whether new in-
fections are driven primarily by a small number of highly
infectious individuals. The latter case is commonly re-
ferred to as “superspreading”, and different epidemics
exhibit superspreading to different degrees. For exam-
ple, during the outbreak of SARS CoV-1 in 2002-2004,
over 80% of cases were observed to result from the top
20% most infectious individuals [8, 9]. Understanding
the degree of superspreading in the current pandemic of
SARS-CoV-2 is crucial for developing strategies to miti-
gate continued spread and informing an educated reopen-
ing procedure [10–13].
Here we present a simple and direct method to under-
stand how the infectiousness (also called the “reproduc-
tion rate” of the disease) varies among infected individ-
uals. At late times after the onset of an epidemic, the
number of infected individuals is large, and consequently
any statistical fluctuations in the growth rate are rela-
tively small, so that the growth rate is well characterized
by the mean infectiousness, µk. However, at early times,
when there are relatively few cases, the growth rate is
stochastic and the degree of randomness depends on the
variance in infectiousness, σ2k, between individuals (Fig.
1a). By examining the variance in growth rate across sub-
populations at these early times (Fig. 1b), we are able to
infer the variation in the distribution of infectiousness. In
our analysis we divide the US cases into counties and ob-
serve how the variance in growth rate across them evolves
as the number of cases increases.
Formalizing this idea, we first present a derivation of
FIG. 1. (a) Illustration of the variance in early-time growth
rate of new cases. At early times, there is noticeable variance
in the rate for growth between counties. As the cases grow,
all counties stabilize towards the average growth rate I ∼
(1 + µk)
t, (dashed black line) where t is the number of days
since the first case in a county. The counties shown are Santa
Barbara, CA (blue), Magoffin, KY (purple), Fountain, IN
(red), Crowley, CO (orange), and Effingham, GA (green). (b)
The number of infections per infected individual as a function
of total infections. In the main figure, each point corresponds
to a given county at a given time point. As the number of
cases increase, the rates narrow in to the mean infection rate.
The mean (points) and variance (bars) of ∆I/I at a given I
are shown in the inset. The variance decreases like (µk+σ
2
k)/I
(black lines).
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2the variance in the exponential growth rate, or number
of new cases per infected individual per day, ∆I/I, using
an SIR framework that incorporates a probability distri-
bution for the infectiousness of a given individual. Our
result implies a simple method for estimating the mean,
µk, and variance, σ
2
k, of the infectiousness k. We apply
this method to data for COVID-19 cases in the USA,
and find a mean infection rate of µk = 0.15 cases/day
and standard deviation of σk & 0.55 cases/day. Since
the standard deviation is considerably larger than the
mean, with σk/µk & 3.7, we conclude that superspread-
ing is prevalent. By our estimate, these results imply
that at least 88% of new cases are caused by the top
10% of most infectious individuals. Our method, which
uses only a direct measurement of variance in detected
case data in the USA, is consistent with estimates of su-
perspreading using surveillance data [14], secondary-case
data [15], and more complicated estimates of cluster size
distribution using Markov Chain Monte Carlo [16].
II. VARIANCE IN GROWTH RATE IN THE SIR
MODEL
In this section we derive a relation between the vari-
ance in the case growth rate and the variance in individ-
ual infectiousness between individuals in the population.
We start with a standard discrete-time SIR model [17],
which is governed by the following difference equations:
∆S = −kI S
N
∆I = kI
S
N
− rI
∆R = rI
(1)
Here, N is the total population and S, I, and R are the
time-dependent numbers of susceptible, infected, and re-
covered individuals, respectively. The parameters k and
r encode the infectiousness and recovery rate of a disease
within a population. The time is effectively discretized
into days by the available data, so we use ∆I rather than
the usual time derivative, dI/dt. The SIR description
typically assumes fixed values for k and r across the pop-
ulation. However, in superspreading contexts there is a
substantial variance in the infectiousness within a pop-
ulation [8, 9, 18, 19]. We account for this variation by
introducing a probability distribution of infectiousness,
p(k), so that the probability for a randomly-selected in-
dividual to have infectiousness in the range (k, k+ dk) is
given by is given by p(k)dk.
For an individual with a given infectiousness, k, the
probability of infecting exactly n others in a day follows
the Poisson distribution, Pois(n; k). The probability that
a randomly selected individual will infect n others is given
by combining the Poisson distribution with the distribu-
tion p(k), giving
P (n) =
∫ ∞
0
dk
e−kkn
n!
p(k). (2)
The first two moments of P (n), µn and σ
2
n, can be cal-
culated independent of the form of p(k):
µn =
∞∑
n=0
nP (n) = µk (3)
σ2n =
∞∑
n=0
(n− µn)2P (n) = µk + σ2k (4)
Equation (4) represents the variance, among all infected
individuals, of the number of new infections caused by
a single person in a given day. When there are I active
cases, the mean number of new cases per infected person,
∆(I+R)/I, is given by the average of I random variables
drawn from the distribution P (n). By the central limit
theorem, it follows that Var(∆(I +R)/I) = σ2n/I. Addi-
tionally, in the SIR model with a finite total population
N , ∆(I + R)/I = kS/N = k(1 − (I + R)/N) decreases
as the susceptible population continually shrinks. Effec-
tively, p(k) is scaled by the factor (1− (I+R)/N), which
represents the fraction of the population that remains
susceptible. Consequently, µk → µk(1− (I +R)/N) and
σ2k → σ2k(1 − (I + R)/N)2. Therefore the total variance
in ∆(I +R)/I follows:
Var
(
∆(I +R)
I
)
=
µk
(
1− I+RN
)
+ σ2k
(
1− I+RN
)2
I
(5)
This result becomes simpler in the limiting case where
there is no significant change in the susceptible popula-
tion (N → ∞). In this limit, we retrieve the case of
simple exponential growth, for which [20]
Var
(
∆I
I
)
=
µk + σ
2
k
I
. (6)
In the limit σk → 0, where every infected individual has
the same infectiousness µk, the variance in the average
infection rate is simply µk/I, which corresponds to the
variance in a Poisson process with rate µk.
In the case of SARS-CoV-2, it is well established that
there are asymptomatic carriers [21–23] who transmit the
virus without being detected, as well as other infections
that are undetected or unreported. Current estimates
typically predict that only 10− 25% [24–26] of cases are
detected. One can attempt to address this effect by as-
suming that there is a fixed detection probability, pdet,
and that the entire infected population, regardless of
symptoms, follows the same infectiousness distribution
p(k). In this case, there are many more infected individ-
uals, I ∼ Idet/pdet, than those detected, which reduces
the statistical fluctuations in the growth rate and makes
our calculation of σ2k a lower bound. The effect of unde-
tected cases is considered in more detail in Appendix C.
In order to be conservative (especially given the possibil-
ity that asymptomatic cases have a lower rate of infection
than symptomatic ones [27, 28]), the results we present
here use pdet = 1.
3We corroborate Eqs. (5) and (6) using a numerical sim-
ulation of the trajectories of infection growth, I(t), for a
given distribution p(k). Reference 18 has suggested that
infectiousness follows a gamma distribution, and conse-
quently, P (n) = NB(n;µ2k/σ
2
k, µk/(µk + σ
2
k)) where NB
is the negative binomial distribution [10, 16]. Using this
assumption, we simulate the growth of the epidemic by
assuming that a given individual i, with infectiousness ki
that is drawn randomly from p(k), generates a number
ni of new cases each subsequent day that is drawn from
Pois(ni; ki). The simulation results confirm Eqs. (5) and
(6), as shown in Appendix A.
III. DATA FOR COVID-19 IN THE USA
We now turn our attention to data for total detected
cases of COVID-19 in the USA, taken from the publicly
available data set at Ref. 29. In the following analy-
sis we limit our consideration to only a short timescale
(∼14 days) after the first infection is detected in a given
county†. This limitation in time scale serves three main
purposes; first, it is likely that through changes in policy,
lockdown, social distancing, mask usage, etc., the average
infectiousness within the population is time-dependent.
By restricting ourselves to a relatively small window of
early times, we may assume that there is a constant av-
erage infectiousness. Second, considering only beginning
stages allows us to neglect the possible saturation of the
susceptible population, effectively allowing us to take the
N → ∞ limit. Finally, the recovery period for COVID-
19 is ∼14 days [30] and so by considering this two week
period, we can treat our system as if there is no recovery
and R→ 0. These restrictions allow us to treat the USA
data using the exponential case, Eq. (6).
In our analysis, the population is divided into geo-
graphic regions and the variance is calculated across dif-
ferent trajectories I(t). The US cases are divided by
county. For each county, we calculate the average number
of new cases per current case per day, ∆I/I, for the first
14 days after the first infection is detected in that county.
The variance in ∆I/I is then calculated among all coun-
ties that have a given fixed value of I (we present data
only for values of I that have at least 250 corresponding
counties). As shown in Fig. 2, the US data generally
follows the predicted ∼ 1/I trend. An unbiased fit of
the data gives Var(∆I/I) ∝ I−0.77. From Eq. (6), we
calculate µk + σ
2
k by averaging Var(∆I/I)× I, weighted
by the number of instances at each I value. One might
worry that the main source of variation comes from dif-
fering average growth rates, µk, in various counties (i.e.
rural vs. urban). However, we show in Appendix B that
† Counties that recorded ∆I < 0 at any point are discarded from
the analysis due to the potential for recording error; such counties
comprise ∼ 20% of the total.
FIG. 2. As the number of infections I in a given county
increases, the variance in infection rate ∆I/I decreases as
(µk + σ
2
k)/I. We observe that the USA data (blue) is in-
consistent with a model of uniform infectiousness, or σk = 0
(dashed red line ). A fit to the data (solid black line) implies
a large variance in infectiousness, such that σk/µk & 3.7.
variance in µk across counties is too small to explain the
large observed variance in ∆I/I.
We calculate µk from the entire USA population by av-
eraging all values of ∆I/I weighted by the current num-
ber of infections. Equivalently, we sum the number of
cases caused each day and then divide by the sum of the
number of cases across those days. This procedure gives
the mean infectiousness, µk, and thus from Eq. (6) and
the fitted slope in Fig. 2, we can infer σ2k.
This procedure yields µk = 0.15 cases/day and σk =
0.55 cases/day. The small value of µ2k/σ
2
k = 0.07, equiv-
alent to the dispersion parameter [16, 31, 32], provides
clear evidence for superspreading during early stages of
the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States.
These results for µk and σk can be used to further
quantify the extent of superspreading. In particular, un-
der the assumption that p(k) follows a gamma distribu-
tion [18], one can calculate the fraction of individuals
Xk0 with infectiousness larger than a given value k0, as
well as the fraction of secondary infections Yk0 that these
individuals are expected to cause:
Xk0 =
∫ ∞
k0
dk p(k) = Q
(
µ2k
σ2k
, k0
µk
σ2k
)
(7)
Yk0 =
∫ ∞
k0
dk p(k)
k
µk
= Q
(
1 +
µ2k
σ2k
, k0
µk
σ2k
)
, (8)
where Q is the Regularized Gamma function. By elimi-
nating k0 we find
Y = Q
(
1 +
µ2k
σ2k
, Q−1
(
µ2k
σ2k
, X
))
. (9)
Equation (9) gives the cumulative share of infections, Y ,
caused by the top X portion of most infectious cases,
4and is plotted in Fig. 3. This result implies (using our
relatively conservative estimate of σk) that 88% of new
infections are produced by the top 10% of most infectious
individuals, while only 2% of cases arise from the 80% of
infected individuals with the lowest infection rates.
FIG. 3. An estimated Lorenz curve for SARS-CoV-2 in-
fections in the USA, which displays the percentage of new
cases that are caused by a given cumulative percentage of
most infectious individuals (solid black). A few points in
the curve are highlighted (dashed grey lines): 69.4%, 87.6%,
and 98.0% of new cases are caused by the top 5%, 10%, and
20% infectious cases, respectively. Accounting for undetected
and asymptomatic cases would apparently make this curve
steeper, corresponding to more severe superspreading.
IV. CONCLUSION
A wide distribution p(k) in infectiousness k leads to
large statistical variation in the early-time growth rate
of a disease. Here we have shown that by calculating
the variance in growth rate among different subpopula-
tions one can infer the variance in p(k). Our result for
COVID-19 cases in the USA suggests that σk/µk & 3.7,
implying a relatively severe superspreading. If we fur-
ther assume that p(k) follows a gamma distribution (as
in Ref. 18), then we can produce a more direct estimate
of the extent of superspreading (Fig. 3). Our relatively
simple and direct method, based on a calculation of vari-
ance in reported case data, can be contrasted with more
complicated methods for inferring the dispersion param-
eter that are based on maximum likelihood estimation
(e.g., Ref. [32] develops such a method using simulated
data), cluster size distributions [16, 33], and surveillance
or tracing data [14, 15]. These methods also tend to yield
a lower-bound estimate for σk/µk. While studies based
on testing and contact tracing (e.g., Refs. [18, 34–36])
remain the definitive method for assessing superspread-
ing, the method we present here may provide a much
simpler way of estimating its prevalence across a much
larger population.
We emphasize that our analysis is unable to determine
whether this large variance is a result of differing biolog-
ical symptoms, social behavior, or other possible expla-
nations. Additionally, this estimation is carried out for
early times to minimize effects from a time varying p(k)
and therefore predominantly speaks to the infectiousness
prior to widespread lockdown measures.
We close by commenting on a number of complicating
factors that we did not include in our analysis and which,
one might suspect, could alter our primary finding of a
large value of σk/µk. For example, we have assumed a
uniform value of µk across different geographic locations;
we have neglected undetected cases; we have ignored the
possible variation in detection rate pdet among different
counties; we have effectively treated each county as an
isolated population and have neglected cross-county in-
teractions; and we have ignored the effects of latency in
disease as well as the potential variation in latency pe-
riods between individuals. In the Appendices, we con-
sider each of these mechanisms in turn and show that
none of them can explain our result, so that our conclu-
sion of prevalent superspreading of SARS-CoV-2 in the
USA remains robust. In brief: the variation in µk among
different geographic locations is too small to explain the
observed variance in growth rate [App. B]; neglecting un-
detected cases leads to an underestimate of the variance
σ2k, so that our result is effectively a lower bound for the
prevalence of superspreading [App. C]; variation in pdet
between counties does not directly affect the variance in
the growth rate (∆Idet)/Idet, other than to provide an
average of pdet < 1, which results in a lower-bound es-
timate of σ2k [App. D]; cross county interactions tend to
reduce the variance, so our result cannot be explained
as a consequence of such interactions [App. E]; and vari-
ations in latency period can only reduce the apparent
variance in growth rate [App. F].
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6Appendix A: Simulations
We employ Monte Carlo simulations to corroborate our
theoretical calculations [Eqs. (5) and (6)]. We start by
adopting the conclusion of Ref. 18 and defining p(k) as
a Gamma distribution with mean µk and standard de-
viation σk. We simulate an outbreak by first randomly
generating a k from the distribution p(k) and then draw-
ing a random n from Pois(n; k). This process is repeated
until a non-zero n is generated, representing an outbreak
starting in a given location with n individuals. Each of
these n infected individuals is given a correspond infec-
tiousness, ki, which they keep for the remainder of the
simulation. Each individual, i, then generates ni new
cases randomly drawn from Pois(ni; ki), and each of these
secondary infections is assigned its own randomly gener-
ated infectiousness as well. During every iteration of the
simulation, representing a day, each infected individual
infects others given by a new random Poisson variable
with mean defined by their own infectiousness. After
a set number of infections is reached, the simulation is
stopped and the trajectory I(t) is recorded. This process
is repeated for 3,000 total trajectories, representing the
∼3,000 counties in the real USA data. This simulated
data is then treated in the same manner as the real data,
which is explained in Sec. 2 of the main text.
We also consider simulations with a recovery phase and
a finite carrying capacity N . To implement recovery,
we specify a given number of days, trec, over which an
infected individual is infectious. Only those who con-
tract the virus within this time period infect others. The
effect of finite carrying capacity N is included by scal-
ing the infectiousness ki of individual i by the factor
S/N = 1− (I+R)/N . For example, someone with infec-
tiousness ki generates a number of cases ni drawn from
the probability distribution Pois(n; ki(1 − (I + R)/N))
each day. This procedure is cut off once a certain fraction
of N is reached, and then repeated 3,000 times. Although
each trajectory follows the same p(k), N can vary be-
tween different trajectories. To account for this variation
in N , we normalize ∆I → √I(∆I/I−µk(1−(I+R)/N)).
We see that the simulated variance matches well with our
theory (Fig. 4).
Appendix B: Variance in µk
It is reasonable to question whether the calculated vari-
ance, σ2k, is a result of various geographic locations hav-
ing differing average infectiousness, µk, due to varying
population density, social norms, etc. One may instead
consider that the mean infectiousness µk follows some
distribution q(µk) among different counties. For a given
µk, we have shown that the variance in P (n;µk, σk) av-
eraged over I realizations is given by
(
µ2k + σ
2
k
)
/I in the
exponential case. Including the effect of a distribution
q(µk), we calculate the variance in ∆I/I to be:
FIG. 4. (a) Variance in the scaled growth rate for a simulated
SIR model with various N values. The variance decreases as
the susceptible population diminishes and infected individu-
als recover. (b) Simulation of an exponential model with no
recovery, which is equivalent to early times in the pandemic.
The variance in average infection rate starts at µk + σ
2
k at
I = 1 and then decreases as ∼ 1/I as the number of infected
individuals increases.
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That is, when we account for the possibility that each
region has a different µk, the value of µk is replaced by
its mean µ¯k across counties, and a constant term is added
for the variance in µk across counties. We can conclude
that this variance cannot fully explain the data for two
reasons. First, we observe a clear Var(∆I/I) ∼ 1/I trend
in the data (Fig. 2), which can only be a result of the
variance in p(k) rather than q(µk). Additionally, we can
directly measure the variance in µk across counties, which
7FIG. 5. (a) The calculated value of the mean infectious-
ness, µk, for each individual county (with at least 10 cases).
The variance in µk is relatively small: Var(µk) = 0.0032
(cases/day)2  σ2k. (b) When we account for this consider-
ation (dashed red line), the fitted value of σ2k decreases from
0.31 → 0.29 (cases/day)2. This adjustment does not signifi-
cantly affect our conclusions.
we find to be 0.003 (cases/day)2. This number is too
small to significantly affect the total variance in ∆I/I,
as seen in Fig. 5. When the measured variance in q(µk) is
taken into account in our fitting procedure, we find that
µ¯k ∼ 0.15 cases/day, σ2k ∼ 0.29 cases2/days2, resulting
in very slightly different value of σk/µk ∼ 3.6.
Appendix C: Undetected Cases
Between asymptomatic cases and imperfect testing,
there are a significant number of active cases, which can
transmit the virus, that do not show up in the data set
we use. One way to take this effect into account is by in-
troducing an average probability that a case is detected,
pdet. All variance calculations occur at fixed values of
the number of detected cases, Idet. Given Idet, the prob-
ability that there are I total cases is given by a negative
binomial distribution:
P (I; Idet) =
(
I − 1
Idet − 1
)
pdet
Idet(1− pdet)I−Idet . (C1)
If there are I active cases, then the probability that ∆I
cases are generated is given by the sum of I random vari-
ables drawn from P (n). Since µn = µk and σ
2
n = µk+σ
2
k,
∞∑
∆I=0
P (∆I; I)∆I = µkI (C2)
∞∑
∆I=0
P (∆I; I)(∆I − µkI)2 = (µk + σ2k)I. (C3)
Once ∆I cases are generated on a given day, the prob-
ability that ∆Idet are detected is given by a binomial
distribution:
P (∆Idet; ∆I) =
(
∆I
∆Idet
)
pdet
∆Idet(1− pdet)∆I−∆Idet .
(C4)
We combine these equations to derive the probability
distribution for the number of new detected cases in a
given day, ∆Idet, given that there are currently Idet active
cases.
P (∆Idet; Idet) =
∞∑
I=Idet
P (I; Idet)
∞∑
∆I=∆Idet
P (∆I; I)P (∆Idet; ∆I).
(C5)
It follows that the mean and variance in ∆Idet/Idet are
Mean
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(C6)
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(C7)
That is, when under-detection is accounted for, an extra
term µ2k(1 − pdet)/Idet is added to the variance due to
the variance in the underlying total number of cases, I.
The term σ2k/Idet is also scaled down by a factor pdet,
since there are on average a larger number I ∼ Idet/pdet
of total cases. Thus, since µ2k(1 − pdet)  µk and σ2k is
suppressed by a factor of pdet, the calculated value of σ
2
k
is a lower bound.
Although there are estimates of the fraction of detected
COVID-19 cases in literature (e.g., Refs. 24–26), in order
to be conservative we do not directly use these estimates
for the parameter pdet in Eq. (C7), due to the possibil-
ity that undetected cases have a different (likely lower)
infectiousness.
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We have shown that a fixed detection rate, pdet, across
counties cannot account for the variance observed within
the US population. However, one can also check to en-
sure that variation in pdet between counties, described
by a probability distribution q(pdet), does not explain
the data either. To account for differing values of pdet
we weight Eq. (C4) by q(pdet) so that P (∆Idet; ∆I) →∫ 1
0
dpdetq(pdet)P (∆Idet; ∆I). Plugging into Eg. (C7) we
see
Var
(
∆Idet
Idet
)
=
µk + µ
2
k(1− pdet) + pdetσ2k
Idet
(D1)
where pdet =
∫ 1
0
dpdetq(pdet)pdet is the mean detection
rate across all counties. Therefore, variance in pdet can-
not explain the large observed variance in (∆I)/I, and a
substantial variation from σ2k is required to explain the
US data.
Appendix E: Cross-County Interactions
Our analysis in the main text operates under the as-
sumption that each county in the USA is an indepen-
dent population in which the virus can spread. However,
it is clear that there is some portion of infections that
cross county lines. To understand how this interaction
can affect the variance in observed growth rate of cases,
we explore what the variance looks like if we have perfect
mixing between M counties, each with I1 active cases. In
this formulation, the variance we calculate is Var(∆I1/I1)
at a given I1. Focusing on a single county with I1 active
cases, the probability that there are I total cases across
the M counties is given by a negative binomial distribu-
tion:
P (I; I1) =
(
I − 1
I1 − 1
)(
1
M
)I1 (
1− 1
M
)I−I1
. (E1)
We have shown that if there are I total cases, then the
mean and variance in the number of new cases, ∆I, is
µkI and (µk + σ
2
k)I, respectively. Once ∆I cases are
generated, they are randomly sorted into the M counties.
Therefore,
P (∆I1; ∆I) =
(
∆I
∆I1
)(
1
M
)∆I1 (
1− 1
M
)∆I−∆I1
.
(E2)
Combining these distributions, the probability that ∆I1
cases occur in a given county that has I1 active cases is:
P (∆I1; I1) =
∞∑
I=I1
P (I; I1)
∞∑
∆I=∆I1
P (∆I; I)P (∆I1; ∆I).
(E3)
From P (∆I1; I1) we calculate the mean and variance in
∆I1/I1 to find:
Mean
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P (∆I1; I1)∆I1
= µk
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M
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(E5)
Since µk = 0.15 cases/day, the term µk+µ
2
k(1−1/M) can-
not account for the variation present in the US. There-
fore, if there is maximal interactions between counties,
then the calculation of σ2k remains a lower bound esti-
mate. Intuitively, one can say that when different coun-
ties interact strongly with each other, there is a larger
underlying number of active cases from which new cases
can be drawn for a given county, and this larger number
reduces the statistical variance.
The previous consideration assumes that all counties
interact evenly with each other. It is possible that some
counties might gain a large number of cases entering from
a neighboring county, while others have more exiting than
entering. To account for this potential source of variance
we consider a single county. Assume there is a fixed por-
tion, pexit, of new infections from cases within a county
that are spread to an outside county, as well as a por-
tion, penter, of new cases from other counties. Both of
these quantities are defined in terms of the number of
cases in the current county, I(t). Consequently, the ef-
fective number of cases leading to new infections in the
current county is (1 − pexit + penter)I(t). Since all coun-
ties are assumed to follow the same underlying distri-
bution p(k), we expect that the mean of ∆I/I will be
(1− pexit + penter)µk. With this understanding, there are
two possibilities: either all counties have equal flows in
and out so that pexit ∼ penter, or there is a balance be-
tween counties with pexit > penter and vice versa. In the
first case, we see that all counties share approximately
the same measured µk while in the later, there is a wide
spread in µk from this cross county interaction. Since
we show in Appendix B that the there is little variance
in µk across counties, this suggests that pexit ∼ penter
within each county. Consequently, the effective number
of cases that can lead to a new case within a given county,
(1− pexit + penter)I(t), varies from the true number, I(t),
only on the order of σµk  σk. Therefore, we conclude
that this effect cannot explain the large variance we ob-
serve.
Appendix F: Variance in Latency
Our analysis ignores the effect of latency between the
moment of infection and the appearance of symptoms
9FIG. 6. We simulate the impact of variance in latency com-
pared to a fixed latency (blue). Here, we use p(L) ∼ eλL
with λ = 1, 2, 3 (orange, green, red). Variance in latency only
decreases the observed variance and consequently cannot ex-
plain the large σk we calculate.
that can lead to detection. This treatment is equivalent
to assuming that there is a fixed latency period for all
infections. In this situation, if the true number of cases
at a given time (counting cases as those infected, and not
necessarily already detected) is I(t), then the number of
cases observed is simply Iobserved(t) = I(t− L), where L
is the amount of time for an individual to start showing
symptoms and be detected. However, it is reasonable
to suspect that some individuals could have shorter or
longer latency periods, and this variance could impact
the overall variance that we calculate. To address this,
we assume that the latency time L follows some distri-
bution q(L) with mean µL. At a given time t, the in-
fections being observed are originating from times in the
vicinity of t− µL. Therefore, the effective number of in-
fected individuals leading to new infections at time t is∑µL+∆L
L=µL−∆L q(L)I(t−L), where 2∆L represents the range
of possible latency times. Since I(t) grows exponentially,
the terms from the most recent time, t = µL −∆L, will
dominate the sum. Consequently, the effective infected
population is always greater than or equal to I(t − µL),
and this effect tends to decreases the overall variance in
∆I/I. This diminishing of the variance with increasing
∆L is corroborated by simulations (Fig. 6).
